

**DETERMINANTS OF INTERNAL AUDITORS BEHAVIOR
IN WHISTLE BLOWING WITH FORMAL RETALIATION
AND STRUCTURAL ANONIMITY LINE AS
MODERATING VARIABLES
(Empirical Study at State-owned Enterprises in Indonesia)**

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Abstract: *The research was aimed to test the determinant of auditors internal behavior in whistle blowing with formal retaliation and structural anonymity line as moderating variables. The population of research was 735 internal auditors of entire State-Owned Enterprises in Indonesia. Census methods was applied to collect the data and the samples were 197 among them. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) aided by Warp PLS 5,0 was used for data processing.*

The conclusion was that auditors attitude on whistle blowing, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control positively influenced whistle blowing intention. Whistle blowing intention positively influenced whistle blowing behavior. Structural anonymity line reinforced the relationship between whistle blowing intention and whistle blowing behavior. Formal retaliation weakened the relationship between whistle blowing intention and whistle blowing behavior.

Key Words: *whistleblowingintention, whistleblowing behavior, formal retaliation, structural anonymity*

1. PRELIMINARY

The acts of Fraud often occur in developing countries with the weak condition of law enforcement and lack of good governance awareness like Indonesia. Thus, the integrity factors are still questionable. According to Association of Certified Fraud Examiner (2011) the types of fraud that are commonly found in Indonesia are assets evasion (43%), financial reporting irregularities (30,30%), irregularities in banking services (24,30%) and data theft (2,40%).

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Based on data released by Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (Indonesian Financial Audit Agency), most of state-owned enterprises and local government-owned enterprises contribute to increasing cases of fraud acts in Indonesia. In last five years, this agency found many cases of financial irregularities and bad corporate governance in both enterprises (up to 510 cases). There were 93 cases among them that resulted in a loss of Rp. 2,69 trillion. Furtherly, this data were reinforced by the report of Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Indonesian Corruption Busting Commission) which indicated 36.001 cases of fraud acts found in both enterprises (www.BPK.go.id).

The large number of violations or fraud acts in SOE handled by Indonesian Financial Audit Agency and Indonesian Corruption Busting Commission showed unwell implementation of good corporate governance. Associated with implementation of good corporate governance, several studies conducted by various institutions, such as Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Association of Certified Fraud Examiner (ACFE) and Global Economic Crime Survey (GECS) concluded that one way to prevent and combat practices that were contrary to good corporate governance was violation reporting mechanism, namely whistle blowing system. Its effectiveness was indicated from the amount of fraud acts detected and so the follow-up in relatively shorter time than the other ways. In addition, the leadership level of the organization had the chance to resolve the problem internally first, prior to the problem extended to the public space where it could affect the organization's reputation (Governance, 2008).

The implementation of the whistle blowing system is also the implementation of good corporate governance which is currently a common fundamental requirement of both government and private sectors. To reinforce furtherly the importance of good corporate governance especially for state-owned enterprises in Indonesia, the government issued a Minister of SOEs Decree, namely Kep.117/M-MBU/2002 on Implementation of Good Corporate Governance in SOEs in article 2, verse 1 which required SOEs to implement good corporate governance consistently and make good corporate governance as the their operational fundament.

Whistle blowing system is defined as a system of reporting/disclosure by all internal elements of the company regarding the information that is believed to contain violations of the laws, regulations, practical guidelines, professional statements, or relating to procedural errors, corruption, abuse of authority, or harm of the public and work place safety (Vinten 1992). Whistle blowing is an effective mechanism to find a breach in the company confirmed by the existence of fraud acts disclosure of financial statements by two largest companies, Enron Energy, Inc. and WorldCom in the history of the United States (Bowen *et al.* 2010). Whistle

blowing as an essential component and best practices of organizational corporate governance framework can give new meaning and play an important role as an internal and social control mechanism (Chiu 2002; Rufus 2004).

Whistle blowing is not a new issue in accounting and ethics researches. Many researches on whistle blowing had been conducted. Most of them examined the influencing factors for individuals to do whistle blowing (Chiu 2002). The next, (Park 2004) and Ponnu *et al.*, (2008) emphasized on individual behavior perspective, namely Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991). It was the development of Theory of Reason Action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).

In the decision-making process for whistle blowing behavior, at first there will be willingness or intention and important values as a determinant factor in prior intention development. Theory of Planned Behavior explains that human behavior intention is influenced by three types of determinant factors that are conceptually independent of one another. They are the attitude on the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control.

Several researches related to the relationship between intention and behavior still suggested different results. Meta-analysis research conducted by Armitage and Corner (2001) showed that although Theory of Planned Behavior was able to predict intention well, but it was not able to predict the relationship between intention and behavior totally. Armitage and Corner only found two empirical supports to prove the relationship between intention and behavior (Park and Blenkinsopp, 2009). While the other researches empirically proved that the intention was not always related to the behavior (Currington *et al.*, 2010).

From several previous studies, it was suggested that there were literally inconsistencies because when intention was formed, it was not always accompanied by behavior. There was a gap between intention and whistle blowing behavior. The influence of intention on behavior was not conclusive yet because it had not considered the situational factors that might strengthen or weaken the relationship between intention and behavior.

The urgency to consider situational factors was also in accordance with the perspective of decision-making model which explained that there was an interaction between individual factors and situational factors that might explain the consistency and inconsistency between intention and individual behavior (Trevino, 1986). Then, Jones (1991) also suggested that individual and situational characteristics interact each other to moderate psychological processes that underlied individual whistle blowing decisions.

Therefore, this study tried to develop a Theory of Planned Behavior model by adding formal retaliation and structural anonymity as situational factors that were

often inherent in the whistle blowing process. Both factors were able to strengthen or weaken the relationship between whistle blowing intention and whistle blowing behavior that had never been conducted in previous studies.

2. THEORETICAL REVIEW

2.1. Theory of Planned Behavior

Theory of Planned Behavior is based on the assumption that humans are rational creatures and they use the information systematically. Humans always think the implications of their actions before deciding to do or not do certain behavior. Theory of Planned Behavior is started by viewing behavioral intention as the closest antecedent of a behavior. The stronger a person's intention to perform a certain behavior, it is expected that he will be more successfully perform certain behavior (Ajzen, 1991).

Intention is a function of beliefs and or important information on tendency of certain behavior to lead to a specific outcome. Intentions could change because of time shifting. The longer the distance between intention and behavior, the greater possibility of intention change. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) was not only interested in predicting the behavior but also identifying the determinant factors of behavioral intention. Attitude is considered as the first antecedents of behavioral intention.

Attitude is a person's beliefs about truth or untruth of an action when it should be done. Attitude is a positive or partial belief when facing an event to be responded or otherwise impartial feeling or negative view.

According to Ajzen (1991)) perceived subjective norms were individual environmental circumstances which accepted or did not accept an indicated behavior. Individuals will demonstrate acceptable behavior by people or environment surrounding them.

The third intention determinant is perceived behavioral control. It indicates a situation when a person thinks that a decision to perform or not to perform certain behavior is under his control. People tend not to build a strong intention to show a certain behavior if they believe that they do not have the resources or the chance to do it although they have a positive attitude and they believe that the other important people will agree them (Ajzen, 1991).

2.2. Whistle Blowing

In general, whistle blowing is defined as the disclosure of illegal actions, immoral or unauthorized practices by organization members or former organization members to the people or organizations that may influence or completing these

actions. Whistle blower is a person who reports the mistake or error of organization exclusively to the management of the organization and a person who reports the mistake of organization to authorized parties outside the organization (Near and Miceli 1985; Vinten 1992).

Basically, there are two types of whistle blowing. They are internal and external error reporting (Dworkin and Baucus 1998; Park and Blenkinsopp 2009; Zhang *et al.* 2009a). Elias (2008) also reinforced the explanation that whistle blowing might occur internally and externally.

Internal whistle blowing occurs when an employee knows a fraud acts done by another employees and then he report it to his supreme or another people in the company. Miceli and Near (2002) said that at first most of the whistle blowers disclosed its findings to the internal parties in the company before reporting it to the public. Whereas, external whistle blowing occurs when an employee knows a fraud done intentionally by the company and then he reports it to external parties such as the government or law enforcement agency, especially if the fraud will harm the community. (Near and Miceli 1996; Ponnu *et al.*, 2008; Bouville 2008).

The term of whistle blower is used to indicate an employee of an organization who reports a mistake to organizations or individuals outside the organization (Near and Miceli 1985; Esther and Brian 2005). Whistle blower may be internal or external figure depending on the parties to whom the complaint will be reported. If error reporting is conveyed by whistle blowers to the people in the organizations such top management, he is internal whistle blower. If the report is conveyed to external parties such as the government or law enforcement agencies, he is an external whistle blower (Bouville 2008; Ponnu *et al.*, 2008; Near and Miceli 1996).

2.3. Formal Retaliation

O'Day (1974) described that retaliation or vengeance was a negative reaction of management of a company on whistle blowing. Retaliation will be considered as a negative action taken by the organization to a whistle blower in responding the mistake reporting (Weinstein 1984). Retaliation can be done in several ways, ranging from coercion to the whistle blower to draw mistake reporting and kick the whistleblower out from organization directly. The other retaliations may include ruining the complaints process by the organization, isolating the whistle blower, reputation defamation, giving difficult assignment, exclusion from meeting, the elimination of bonuses and other types of discrimination or harassment (Parmerlee *et al.* 1982).

Retaliation or vengeance can be done by top management, supervisor or direct supreme of whistle blower and co-workers. Supervisor can be motivated to retaliate

a whistle blower because of fear in their inability to maintain order and compliance in his department. There is also fear of retaliation or termination (O'Day, 1972; Parmerlee *et al.*, 1982).

Retaliation can be done both formally and informally. Informal retaliation is defined as action or reaction that does not require the approval of the supreme and it can be done without the document initiation. Formal retaliation will include some actions involving written documentation or ruled by regulation and procedures of how and when it is going to be implemented (Rehg *et al.*, 2008).

2.4. Structural Anonymity Reporting Line

In order to encourage whistle blowing, a reporting procedure must ensure that the organization will protect the identity of whistle blowers (Lewis 2006). A hotline reporting line enables and encourages employees to give the secret and the information without fear of retaliation when they become whistle blowers (Pergola and Sprung 2005). An internal reporting line that keep the identity is an important tool and it has the added value for the organization (Rufus 2004).

Anonymous reporting line is very useful in encouraging the reporting of mistakes done by organization members because the anonymity will minimize the potential consequences such as retaliation and the other potential punishments (Moberly 2006) and especially anonymous reporting channel that is involving the management level is indispensable (AICPA 2005).

Structural models are based on the assumption that a company builds visible, serious, and formal internal line in exposing mistakes. Structural model provides a direct and legitimate reporting line from the employees to the board of directors. Direct line to the board of directors will encourage effective whistle blowing because it avoids blocking and filtering information by company executives (Moberly 2006).

According to Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory, one of the human needs is the need for safety. Safety needs refers to someone's needs for security and protection from physical and emotional harm or crime, and so the guarantee that the physical needs are fulfilled. Thus, an anonymous reporting line will be able to meet an individual needs of security. Sarbanes-Oxley required providing of anonymous reporting line which will encourage the employees to give information fearlessly. Through the anonymous reporting line, the employees and individuals will be more comfortable and safe because their identities are protected.

In their study, Kaplan *et al.* (2009) explained that a structural model could be created through the hotline that is provided internally by the company with weak level of procedural security and through a third party outside the company with a strong procedural security level. Both lines provided are anonymous. Seifert *et al.*

(2010) also tested the effectiveness of anonymous reporting line in a structural model.

2.5. Hypothesis Development

The Influence of Auditors Attitude Towards Whistle Blowing on Whistle Blowing Intention

Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior, the individual attitude on a certain behavior is acquired from his belief on the consequences caused by the behavior. It is called behavioral beliefs. When an individual is sure that certain behavior can result a positive outcome, then he will have a positive attitude and will create an intention to do it (Ajzen, 1991).

Several previous studies had proven that an individual with positive beliefs on behavior would have intention to do the action (Randall and Gibson,1991); Park and Blenkinsopp (2009). From the descriptions above, the first hypothesis formulated is:

H1: The auditors attitude on whistle blowing positively influences whistle blowing intention.

The Influence of Auditors Subjective Norms on Whistle Blowing Intention

Explained by the Theory of Planned Behavior, subjective norm is defined as the individual's perception on present social pressures to perform or not perform a certain behavior. An individual is sure that the other individuals or particular environment will accept or not accept his actions. When he believes in what the environment or group norms are, then he will adhere and perform the appropriate behaviors to his environment or group (Ajzen, 1991).

From several previous researches, it was ever proved that subjective norms influenced certain intentions (Alleyne *et al.* (2013); Park and Blenkinsopp (2009); Ponnu *et al.* (2008); Gibson and Frakes (1997); Leonard and Cronan (2001); Jones (1991); Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005). Thus, the second hypothesis is :

H2: The auditors subjective norms positively influence whistle blowing intention.

The Influence of Auditors Perceived Behavioral Control on Whistle Blowing Intention

According to the Theory of Planned Behavior, perceived behavioral control indicates a situation where an individual thinks that the decision to perform or not perform a certain behavior is under his control. The people tend not to build a

strong intention to perform a certain behavior if they believe that they do not have the resources or the chance to do it although they have positive attitude and they also believe that the other important people will agree it (Ajzen, 1991).

Preceding researches had ever proved the influence of perceived behavioral control on intention (Alleyne *et al.* (2013); Park and Blenkinsopp (2009); Ponnu *et al.* (2008); Beu *et al.* (2003). Based on previous researches, it was proved that perceived behavioral control was the strongest predictor of intention to obey the rules (Broadhead-Fearn and White, 2006). From the discussion above, the third hypothesis developed is:

H3: Auditors perceived behavioral control positively influences whistle blowing intention.

The Influence of Auditors Whistle Blowing Intention on Whistle Blowing Behavior

Intention is assumed as a motivational factor that influences individual behavior. Intention of prosocial whistle blowing is a situation where someone wants to conduct whistle blowing or interests owned by someone to tend to adopt whistle blowing behavior which based on prosocial action although such behavior has become a task/role to help, improve the advantage for a group of individuals or certain organization and not for his own benefit (developed from Brief and Motowidlo, 1986).

Intention is considered as antecedent factor of behavior and it is considered as major factor in the Theory of Planned Behavior model because it is regarded as an intermediary for motivational factors that have an impact on certain behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Beck and Ajzen, 1991). Intention to perform a certain behavior is an indication of the readiness of someone to perform the behavior. So, the intention to perform a certain behavior is a direct antecedent factor of behavior itself (Ahmed *et al.*, 2010). Therefore, the fourth hypothesis formulated is :

H4: Auditors whistle blowing intention positively influences whistle blowing behavior.

The Influence of Formal Retaliation on Relationship Between Whistle Blowing Intention and Whistle Blowing Behavior

Retaliation is a negative reaction of the management to someone who has done whistle blowing (O'Day, 1974). Formal retaliation includes some actions involving written documentation or regulated by rules and procedures on how and when they are implemented. Retaliation or vengeance will be a means for organizations to control the whistle blowers through the power. In this context, retaliation is a

bureaucratic response to the threat or tactical actions to prevent future threats to the organization caused by whistle blowing reporting.

The same argument was also expressed by Weinstein (1984). He explained that whistle blowing was a challenge for the authority and bureaucratic organization structure. Therefore, retaliation will be considered as a negative action done by the organization against a whistle blower in responding mistake reporting. Experience of a whistle blower who gets retaliation will cause a strong influence on his willingness and possibility to perform whistle blowing behavior in the future (Casal and Zalkind, 1995; Miceli and Near, 1992). Thus, the fifth hypothesis of this study is:

H5: Formal retaliation weakens the relationship between whistle blowing intention and whistle blowing behavior.

The Influence of Structural Anonymity on Relationship Between Whistle Blowing Intention and Whistle Blowing Behavior

Moberly (2006) explained that a structural model was based on the assumption that the company established a visible internal and formal line in uncovering fraud acts. Structural model provides direct and legitimate reporting line from the employees to the board of directors. Direct line to the board of directors will encourage whistle blowing more effectively because it avoids information blocking and filtering by company executives. A structural anonymous line can ensure that the organization will keep the identity secretly and protect it from the retaliation threat when reporting fraud acts.

A reporting line should allow and encourage the employees to give the secret or information inside without fear of retaliation accompanying when they become whistle blowers (Pergola and Sprung, 2005). In the other side, a reporting line can be an important tools for whistle blowers and the added value for the organization (Rufus, 2004).

Such arguments were consistent with conclusion of previous researches which explained that the availability of anonymous line could increase internal control system because financial reporting fraud acts would be communicated and reported as early as possible (Hooks *et al.*, 1994; Kaplan *et al.*, 2009). According to Kaplan *et al.* (2009) the effectiveness of anonymous reporting line would be the most effective mechanism for early detection of fraud acts than the others and it would potentially help to prevent or eliminate fraud acts in the future. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis proposed is:

H6: Structural anonymity strengthens the relationship between whistle blowing intention and whistle blowing behavior.

3. METHODS OF RESEARCH

3.1. Population and Samples

The population of the study was 795 internal auditors of SOEs in Indonesia and the 197 among them were processed as samples. The data processed for this study were primary data obtained from their answers in questionnaires that were distributed. Then, data processing for their answers was done through SPSS version 19,0 and Warp Partial Least Square (Warp PLS) version 5.0. Through data processing, hypothesis testing was done, later.

3.2. Variable Measuring

The operational definition of variables and attitude measuring indicators on the auditors behavior, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, intention and whistle blowing behavior were based on Ajzen (1991) and Park and Blenkinsopp (2009). Each respondent was asked to answer every question with 5 points Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (neutral), 4 (agree), and 5 (strongly agree).

4. RESULTS

The test results through Warp PLS 5.0 presented in Figure 4.1. suggested that all relationships among independent and dependent variables were significant at confidence level of $P < 0,005$.




Table 2.1
Hypothesis Testing Conclusions

<i>Hypotheses</i>	<i>Path Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>P-Value</i>	<i>Conclusions</i>
H1	0.158	0.069	0.012	Accepted
H2	0.161	0.069	0.011	Accepted
H3	0.435	0.065	< 0.001	Accepted
H4	0.194	0.069	0.003	Accepted
H5	-0.143	0.069	0.020	Accepted
H6	0.163	0.069	0.010	Accepted

5. DISCUSSIONS

The Influence of Auditors Attitude Towards Whistle Blowing on Whistle Blowing Intention

Statistical test through both program softwares supported the first hypothesis which stated that the auditors attitude on whistle blowing positively influenced whistle blowing intention (significant at 0,158, p 0,012). The stronger auditors attitude on whistle blowing, the stronger their whistle blowing intention.

Their attitude towards behavior as a predictor of whistle blowing intention was a combination of positive beliefs of a person to such behavior (behavioral beliefs) and a positive evaluation of such behavior (evaluation of behavioral beliefs). The conclusion of study were consistent with previous studies which suggested evidence that attitude was significant predictor of intention (Randall and Gibson, 1991; Chang, 1998; Park and Blenkinsopp, 2009) and Buchan (2005). They found empirical supports for the influence of attitude on intention among accountants.

The Influence of Auditors Subjective Norms on Whistle Blowing Intention

Second hypothesis which stated that auditors subjective norms positively influenced whistle blowing intention was accepted (significant at 0,16, p. 0,011). The stronger auditors subjective norms, the stronger their whistle blowing intention.

Subjective norms are not only determined by the existence of normative beliefs. But, they are also determined by motivation to comply. Normative beliefs are related with expectations derived from the referred or influential individuals and groups for the internal auditors (significant others).

Motivation to comply is motivation to follow certain behaviors. They will feel the social pressure to do it (Buchan 2005). The research conclusion was in line with (Randall and Gibson, 1991; Chang, 1998; Bobek and Hatfield, 2003; Park and

Blenkinsopp, 2009; Alleyne, 2013) which empirically found the support for a significant predictor of intention.

The Influence of Auditors Perceived Behavioral Control on Whistle Blowing Intention

The third hypothesis stated that auditors perceived behavioral control positively influenced whistle blowing intention. Through statistical test, third hypothesis was accepted (significant at 0,434 and $p < 0.001$). The result was consistent with the Theory of Planned Behaviour which stated that whistle blowing intention depended on the resources and opportunities available so that they could reach a certain behavior.

Auditors perceived behavioral control is established by interaction of control factors and the evaluation of those factors. The more people feel a lot of supporting factors and less limiting factor to perform a behavior, then the people will directly perceive themselves to easily perform such behavior.

This conclusion was consistent with several previous studies which found that auditors perceived behavioral control was predictor of intention (Alleyne et.al (2010); Park and Blenkinsopp (2009).

The Influence of Auditors Whistle Blowing Intention on Whistle Blowing Behavior

From statistical test, the fourth hypothesis which stated that auditors whistle blowing intention positively influenced whistle blowing behavior was supported. (significant at 0,19 and $p 0,003$). The results showed that the whistle blowing intention was an antecedent of whistle blowing behavior and it was mediating variable of relationship among motivational factors (such as auditors attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control) and auditors behavior.

The conclusion also reinforced the Theory of Planned Behavior which stated that intention was willingness to perform certain activities in the future and it had a close relationship with attitude and behavior. Therefore, it was an intermediating variable that caused a behavior of attitude or other variables. The result of this study was also consistent with the meta-analysis of Armitage and Conner (2001) and Beck and Ajzen (1991).

The Influence of Formal Retaliation on Relationship Between Whistle Blowing Intention and Whistle Blowing Behavior

The fifth hypothesis stated that formal retaliation weakened the relationship between whistle blowing intention and whistle blowing behavior. Through

statistical test conducted, the fifth hypothesis was supported. It was right that formal retaliation negatively and significantly influenced relationships between whistle blowing intention and whistle blowing behavior (significant at $-0,14$ and $p < 0,02$).

The research proved that formal retaliation such as sanction of employers, the obstruction in their career and termination of duty or dismissal would weaken the whistle blowing decision-making intention. Moreover, there is lack of legal protection from the government on threats or retaliation arising from the disclosure of fraud.

Although there has been a rule of law protection in Indonesia but the rule is still not enough for the whistle blowers. Thus, empirically it was proven that the formal retaliation was moderating variable of relationships between whistle blowing intention and whistle blowing behavior. Arnold and Ponemon (1991) and Liyanarachchi and Newdick (2009) concluded that there was no significant influence of retaliation power on whistle blowing intention.

The Influence of Structural Anonymity on Relationship Between Whistle Blowing Intention and Whistle Blowing Behavior

Based on statistical test for sixth hypothesis, it was proven that structural anonymity strengthened the relationship between whistle blowing intention and whistle blowing behavior (significant at $0,16$ and $p < 0,01$). The results indicated that a whistle blower will be encouraged to report fraud after being sure that the organization would protect the identity and not disclose the name. A structural reporting line established with the complainant name and identity covering is an important tool for the whistle blower.

This conclusion was consistent with previous research which explained that the availability of anonymous line could improve internal control system. Financial reporting fraud was able to be communicated and reported as early as possible (Hook *et al.*, 1994; Kaplan *et al.*, 2009).

6. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This research was able to prove that the Theory of Planned Behavior approach was devoted to specific behaviors performed by individuals and it was able to be used for all general behaviors including whistle blowing behavior. Attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control positively influenced whistle blowing intention. Intention is a determinant factor of behavior and it is a main factor in Theory of Planned Behavior model because it becomes an influencing motivational factor for behavior.

This study added influencing situational factors of organization in decision making process for whistle blowing beside individual factors established by the Theory of Planned Behavior. Structural anonymity reporting line as situational factor was proved to be able to reinforce the whistle blowing intention. While formal retaliation was proved to be able to weaken the intention of someone to perform whistle blowing behavior. This study supported the decision making interaction model proposed by Trevino (1990) which explained that situational factors might moderate the decision making process.

However, there are two limitations of this study. First, formal retaliation was only attributed and not able to give a clear description whether the same form of retaliation would be given for different types of mistake or violation reported. Second, the Theory of Planned Behavior approach is just able to predict until whistle blowing behavior and not until its implications for whistle blowers, organizations and society.

For the future research, it is recommended to to emphasize more on retaliation associated with the type of mistake or violation reported. The future research is also suggested to be expanded to its implication on fraud acts prevention and detecting.

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