DEMAND OF FOREST LAND USE ON MANAGING FOREST RESOURCES WITH THE COMMUNITY(PHBM) SYSTEM

Abstract

This study aimed to analyze demand of forest land use on Pemalang Forest District (Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan or KPH), Central Java Indonesia. This analysis used demand theory. According to Marshall all demanded goods must have a price (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001). Managing Forest Resources with the Community (Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Hutan Bersama Masyarakat or PHBM) system was designed to anticipate or prevent potential interference with the forest and the region, especially the act of logging without responsibility (illegal logging). Thus, if the PHBM system was not implemented by Perum Perhutani (a state owned company managing the area), so Perum Perhutani being disadvantage, because the illegal logging higher and higher was conducted by forest villagers. With the PHBM system, the forest village communities represented by local community organizations (Lembaga Masyarakat Desa Hutan or LMDH) could utilize forest land by paying the land rent without money but paid in the form of opportunity cost (income sacrificed) was not acceptable to steal wood and Perum Perhutani accepted of opportunity cost (income sacrificed) was LMDH did not steal wood and Perum Perhutani losses could be minimized. As Amarendra study (2009) offers a proxy price (rent) the opportunity costof land. The study was conducted in KPH Pemalang with 43 LMDH. Estimated research model was formulated in the form of Multiple Linear Regression, with the dependent variable was land-use demanded, while the independent variable was the price or rent of land that proxied by opportunity cost as much as the stealing wood, value of the harvest andsharing. The results showed that sharing variables have a stronger influence on land that used by LMDH. Price elasticity of demandforest land use wasεh <1, which means that the elasticity of demand is in-elastic. This indicates that the percentage change in the area of forest land was used by LMDH smaller than the change percentage in prices that was proxied by sacrificed income or levels timber theft. Thus LMDH not responsive to the reduction in the chance to steal wood. Sacrificed incomes were smaller (down one thousand rupiahs)would cause an increasein demand forland useunder 1m2, meaning that the Perum Perhutani policy in reducing illegal logging becomes ineffective. Therefore, efforts were needed to increase the elasticity of demand forest land use by Perum Perhutani.